


UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Washington, D.C. 20451

OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR




April 27, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Robert M. Kimmitt,
Executive Secretary, National Security Council

Charles Hill,
Executive Secretary, Department of State

Colonel John H. Stanford,
Executive Secretary, Department of Defense


Executive Secretary, Central Intelligence Agency

STAT

SUBJECT: Bilderberg Speech

A draft copy of the Director's speech before the Bilderberg meeting at Saltsjobaden, Sweden is attached. Any comments you may have on this speech should be phoned to me (632-8478) not later than noon, Tuesday, May 1, 1984.

Barbara Godelak fs
William B. Staples
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
As stated



L-266

NEW TRACKS TOWARD EFFECTIVE ARMS CONTROL

A standard saying in Washington runs something like this: "Negotiating with the Soviets is not really all that bad compared to the ordeal of negotiating, and a sometimes battling, within the United States Government to get a position in the first place."

It is uttered only half in jest and reminds one of Winston Churchill's now famous characterization of democracy as "the worst system ever invented -- except for all the rest". In truth, the disagreements that take place over the bargaining table in Geneva can pale compared to some of the debates over arms control purposes and policies that take place in Washington. The Executive Branch, the Congress, the press, the bureaucracy and the public all partake to varying degrees, depending on the issue.

Having a general understanding of how systems work in the West, the Soviets frequently assume that if they sit back and hang tough, they can count on the West to negotiate with itself and come up with new proposals to try to move them. It is an age-old strategy. Unfortunately, experience has shown the Soviets that it is not an unwise strategy for them to pursue.

This underlines the need for some constancy and consensus, or at least sufficient support, if our arms control efforts are to be successful. The Reagan Administration has put great effort into building bipartisan support at home and greater commonality and consultation with our Allies. This also underlines the need to try to look ahead, farther down the road, to see how we can strengthen our basic arms control objectives and the public confidence in them.

- 2 -

I am assuming -- and, I trust, fairly -- that all of us here have a good grasp of exactly where the different arms control negotiations stand today:

- o The Soviets have walked out of the INF talks. It is uncertain whether and when they will come back to separate negotiations on these weapon systems.
- o The Soviets have indefinitely suspended the START talks but are likely to return, if not later this year then next.
- o The US is actively reviewing issues in these areas to insure that when the Soviets do come back, we will be ready and flexible.
- o Multilateral arms control negotiations will be where much of the action is this year.
- o The Conference on Disarmament will have a lot to focus on in working toward a total global ban on chemical weapons as recently proposed by the US.
- o The MBFR negotiations are again underway. The West looks forward to showing some flexibility on the data question if the East is ready to be flexible on verification issues.
- o In the CDE in Stockholm, we look forward to trying to get down to serious negotiations, but Soviet willingness remains a question mark.

Rather than rehash in greater detail specific issues in these negotiations, I would like to focus today on two longer-term approaches -- somewhat "new tracks", if you will -- toward achieving our arms

-3-

control objectives. The first is the need to seek ways by which we can, over time, reduce the role and perceived importance of nuclear weapons in our defense posture. The second is the desirability of giving further consideration to how we might advance arms control objectives through less formal and probably less comprehensive arrangements. Both of these tracks have potential promise if we are willing and able to pursue them.

De-Emphasizing Nuclear Weapons

Nuclear deterrence will, for as far as we can see into the future, be a central element in US security policy. The US commitment of that deterrent for the protection of US Allies is at the heart of NATO. Whatever else we do, we must not cast doubt on the viability of that deterrent strategy, as doubt only increases instability and the chances of miscalculation.

But a number of factors argue for beginning to examine some possible steps toward reducing the extent to which we rely on nuclear weapons in US and Western security strategy. For one, the US no longer has the clear nuclear superiority that it enjoyed up until the late 1960's. For another, the prospect that nuclear war could have drastic, long-term, global effects is being driven home by new research. The idea of a "nuclear winter" knows no boundaries between attacker and the attacked, or between combatants and innocent peoples.

Finally, there is great concern among Western publics over nuclear weapons. This is understandable. Public confidence in our deterrent strategy will be undermined if we are perceived as relying too heavily on the threat of nuclear annihilation.

-4-

It is both reasonable and possible to provide decision-makers with capabilities that will present options other than the Hobson choice of early initiation of nuclear weapons use or inaction. New conventional weapons technologies offer one way to reduce our reliance on nuclear weapons. Nuclear arms control can also help.

Significant opportunities are opening up in conventional weapons systems that could provide ways of de-emphasizing nuclear weapons on both the strategic and theater levels. Conventional weapons that could effectively assume military roles that up until now have been achievable only by nuclear weapons are on the horizon. These systems are based on technologies for improved ways of finding and distinguishing targets on the battlefield and in the rear; on more sophisticated command, control and communications systems; and on more effective conventional munitions -- the so-called smart weapons.

Our arms control efforts are designed to affect significant reductions in forces. START and INF would directly reduce nuclear weapons. All our proposals in these talks are consistent with our nuclear deterrence strategy. Nevertheless, they reflect a willingness to reduce the emphasis that has been placed to date on nuclear weapons.

In addition, the West has taken several unilateral steps to reduce nuclear weapons. The US nuclear stockpile today is

-5-

a third below its 1967 peak, yet still more effective. Alliance decisions over the last four years will result in a net decrease of 2,400 weapons in the nuclear stockpile in Europe.

These arms control efforts, combined with improvements in our conventional capabilities can set the stage for a security policy that places less emphasis on the role of nuclear weapons. Some of these conventional opportunities and programs are, admittedly, still in the early stages of development. But we need to look at them now in terms of how they can enhance our deterrent posture and public confidence in it.

A look at the late 1950's and, particularly, the 1960's shows us that efforts to significantly strengthen conventional capabilities have run up against two major concerns. The first relates to the effect generally on the US nuclear commitment to NATO; the second relates to cost.

Past efforts by the US to strengthen conventional capabilities -- and thereby to de-emphasize nuclear weapons -- run the risk of seeming to Europeans as a weakening of the basic American commitment to its Allies. It seems to me, however, that strengthened conventional capabilities would actually enhance that commitment by supplementing, not replacing, the nuclear component.

Conventional forces are, generally speaking, more expensive than nuclear defense. On the other hand, the real cost of significantly strengthened conventional defense is not clear. More effective ways of managing the collective defense resources of the Alliance offer the possibility of deploying more capable

conventional forces without having to make great increases in our defense expenditures. Finally, cost issues also have to be weighed against the prospect of not having a military response when it is really wanted or needed.

This does not argue for a change in NATO's strategy of deterrence and flexible response. That doctrine, carefully crafted in the 1960's, has served the Alliance well and remains valid today.

But the concept of flexible response was intended to be based on, and should be based on, a balanced mix of conventional and nuclear forces. What I am suggesting is that we need to give greater attention to steps to strengthen the conventional leg of that mix.

A conventional build-up should, of course, not be entertained as a way to make possible a policy of "no first-use" of nuclear weapons. Even if such a major build-up were attainable, which is highly questionable, that policy would be both unwise and dangerous. To qualify the US commitment to its own defense or to the defense of Europe with a "no first-use" posture would lower the Soviet calculation of the risks and potential costs of aggression against NATO. That would not serve our fundamental policy objective of deterrence.

Escalation to nuclear weapons would be a grave step, one which the Alliance would want to take only after deliberate and careful consideration. It is not a decision that we would want to be rushed into by the press of events if we did not need to be rushed.

Flexible response -- supplemented by a integrated policy for conventional force development that would offer a choice of

- 7 -

"no early first-use" -- would preserve an effective deterrent and go a long way to reassuring our publics. And, as Professor Michael Howard has noted, "reassurance" of Western publics and political structures has been as important in maintaining our freedom and security as has "deterrence" in its narrower sense.

De Facto And De Jure Arms Control

Generally speaking, in arms control efforts to date we have sought formal agreements as the means of imposing limits. These, of course, establish mutual and specific legal obligations binding on the parties. We should, where possible, continue to seek such legally binding arrangements to reduce and otherwise limit arms.

At the same time, we should be alert to possibilities for engaging in arms control by mutual restraint. This could be comprised, for example, of statements of national policy -- unilateral undertakings by the sides -- which could be negotiated and confirmed in exchanges of declarations or letters. The outcome would be de facto arrangement which, in some instances, could be both easier to achieve and simpler to carry out.

These kind of arrangements would not, obviously, apply to all situations. In weighing the relative merits of a de jure or de facto arrangement in any given case, certain considerations come to mind.

Comprehensiveness is one of them. This is both a virtue and a problem. It is a virtue in the sense that it is best to limit all critical categories of arms and forces. Otherwise, systems that are not limited have a tendency to be built up and exploited. This can, effect, undercut the constraints on systems limited. It

-8-

is a lot like a balloon that is squeezed in one area only to bulge out in areas that are not so constrained.

The first strategic arms limitation agreement, for example, froze the number of Intercontinental Ballistic Missile and Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile launchers, but placed no limitations on the number of warheads and only indirect limits on throwweight -- important measures of the overall destructive capability of missiles. We have witnessed, during the 1970's, significant increases in the number of warheads on these missiles and, particularly, a tremendous increase in the destructive capability of the Soviet missile forces.

While a more comprehensive agreement is more likely to limit real military capability, they are by definition more complex and difficult to negotiate. They are also, in many respects, much more difficult to verify. In fact, achieving comprehensive agreements in some areas are today, just as they have been throughout the history of arms control, virtually impossible because of the verification difficulties. Hence, we establish priorities and seek to be as comprehensive as possible.

De facto arrangements would have a tendency to be less comprehensive, and to focus on areas or systems where verification presents fewer rather than more problems. They would, in theory, be easier to negotiate and possibly quicker. By being less formal, de facto arrangements would also be more easily modified if circumstances changed than would legally-binding treaties or agreements. That, as well, can cut both ways depending on the circumstances.

-9-

In going down a more limited path in any given area, however, we would need to consider the impact or effect on our broader objectives.

In the United States, not to mention other countries, law requires that any obligation undertaken with regard to arms control or disarmament must be approved by the Senate as a treaty or authorized by special enabling legislation passed by both Houses of Congress. The SALT I Interim Agreement was approved in the latter manner. Alternatively, restraint as a national policy -- such as our policy on not undercutting SALT I or SALT II as long as the Soviets exercise similar restraint -- would not necessarily require that kind of approval. Nevertheless, working closely with Congress will always be necessary to avoid any appearance of trying to "end-run the system".

I am not suggesting that we should turn our attention away from the long and arduous negotiations on arms control agreements to more simple approaches outside of agreements. That would not serve Western interests or likely be successful.

But I am suggesting that, as we look down the road at arms control, it may be possible to advance our objectives in certain areas by establishing mutual restraint through de facto, reciprocal undertakings. Given the obvious problems of negotiating and then achieving approval for full-fledged arms control accords, we should not ignore those possibilities.

Nor am I suggesting that this restraint should be unilateral. Unilateral examples can be important. We should, I think we will

-10-

all agree, try to lead the way toward more stabilizing and survivable systems. That is critical to reducing the risks of war.

But unilateral action does not usually get us very far and is not sufficient. While the West exercised restraint in developing strategic capabilities in the 1970's, we witnessed a massive and unsurpassed Soviet buildup. So, I am focusing on reciprocal, not unilateral, undertakings.

Barbara Tuchman once observed that "a problem that strikes one in the study of history, regardless of period, is why man makes a poorer performance of government than of almost any other human activity". That, too, is reminiscent of Winston Churchill.

But, in the advanced nuclear age, we cannot afford poor performance in our security and arms control strategies. Nor can we afford not to try to look down the road to possible new, or at least different, horizons. I have tried to outline a couple of those today. More obviously exist and will warrant our attention.

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Financial Report

Year ended June 30, 1973

345 East 46 Street
New York, N.Y. 10017

Contents

I. Accountants' report

Balance sheet **2**

Statements of income and expenditures and unexpended
income balances **4**

General Fund **4**

International Center Building Fund—Fund for Operations **5**

International Center Building Fund—Fund for Amortization
of Mortgage **6**

Notes to financial statements **6**

II. Supplementary Information

Program Expenditures—General Fund **7**

Payments to Organizations, Institutions and Individuals **8**

Marketable Securities **10**

Endowment Fund **10**

General Fund—General Income Reserve **12**

General Fund—Fund for New Projects **12**

International Center Building Fund—Fund for
Amortization of Mortgage **12**

Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP80B01495R000100080001-5

I. Accountants' Report

MAIN LAFRENTZ & CO.

CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS

The Executive Committee of the Board of Trustees
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

We have examined the balance sheet of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace as of June 30, 1973 and the related statements of income and expenditures and unexpended income balances for the year then ended. Our examination was made in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards, and accordingly included such tests of the accounting records and such other auditing procedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances.

The statements have been prepared on the basis of cash receipts and disbursements as explained in Note 1 of notes to financial statements.

In our opinion, such financial statements present fairly the assets and liabilities of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace at June 30, 1973, resulting from cash transactions, and the income collected and expense disbursed and changes in unexpended income balances during the year then ended, on a basis consistent with that of the preceding year.

Main Lafrentz & Co.
Certified Public Accountants

New York, New York
October 18, 1973

	Liabilities	1973	1972
Income Funds			
General Fund			
Sundry liabilities		\$ 6,541	\$ 6,443
Unexpended income balances			
Restricted			
Ford Foundation grants		14,623	31,662
Carnegie Corporation grants		5,409	1,955
New York Community Trust			340
Rockefeller Foundation grant		45,190	4,000
Donations toward Bilderberg Conferences		18,954	13,794
Miscellaneous—Middle East Project		2,805	18,693
		<u>84,981</u>	<u>70,444</u>
Unrestricted			
Carnegie Peace Fund of 1910			
For Current Projects		91,457	102,448
General Income Reserve		296,361	296,361
Income Fund for New Projects		1,592	429,300
		<u>474,391</u>	<u>898,553</u>
Income expended for furniture and equipment		1	1
Reserve for replacement of furniture and equipment		16,517	15,058
		<u>16,517</u>	<u>15,058</u>
Total General Fund		\$ 497,450	\$ 920,055
International Center Building Fund			
Mortgage payable, 4½%, due 1/1/91, approximately \$72,000 due in current year		\$ 1,855,431	\$ 1,924,678
Income expended for International Center Building		3,723,101	3,641,592
		<u>5,578,532</u>	<u>5,566,270</u>
Fund for Operations—unexpended income balance		24,833	3,692
Fund for Amortization of Mortgage—unexpended income balance		664,914	636,594
		<u>689,747</u>	<u>640,286</u>
Total International Center Building Fund		\$ 6,268,279	\$ 6,206,556

	Liabilities		
Corpus Fund			
Endowment Fund			
Principal			
Original principal of Fund		\$10,000,000	\$10,000,000
Special Trust Fund (Note 4)		45,939	45,939
Realized net gains on investments (Note 5)		18,679,324	14,569,412
Due to custodian			12,834
		<u>18,725,263</u>	<u>14,698,185</u>
Total Corpus Fund		\$28,725,263	\$24,628,185
Total all Funds		\$35,490,992	\$31,754,796

Department of the Treasury

REC'D AUCT. SEPT. AUG 14 1972

Internal Revenue Service
Washington, DC 20224

Date:

AUGUST 11, 1972

In reply refer to:



▷ CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR
INTERNATIONAL PEACE
345 EAST 46TH STREET
NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10017

Gentlemen:

In accordance with the notification you recently submitted, we have classified you as a private foundation as defined in section 509(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, and as an operating private foundation as defined in section 4942(j)(3).

Your classification as an operating private foundation is based on the assumption that your operations will be as stated in your notification. Any changes in your purposes, character, or method of operation must be reported to your District Director so he may consider the effect on your status.

Sincerely yours,

Chief, Rulings Section
Exempt Organizations Branch

5 March 1974

216
NOTE FOR THE DIRECTOR

FROM: Ed Proctor ☐

I have read the attached booklet on the Carnegie Endowment which Tom Hughes sent you. Only one of the programs (FACE-TO-FACE, pages 21-24) looks like it might be adaptable to our needs as a Brookings-type approach to the academic world. The rest of the programs are either inappropriate or too controversial (e.g., PROJECT DIALOGUE which grew out of student reaction to the Cambodian invasion of 1970).

If after reading FACE-TO-FACE you feel we should pursue this possibility, please let me know and I will contact Tom Hughes directly. I will try to determine whether he would be receptive to our participation in this program or to experimenting with a similar program focused on intelligence.

ACTION

STAT

TO:

		ACTION	INFO.			ACTION	INFO.
1	DCI			11	IG		
2	DDCI			12	Comp		
3	DDS&T			13	SAVA		
4	DDI	✓		14	ASST/DCI		
5	DDO			15	AO/DCI		
6	DDM&S			16	EX/SEC		
7	D/DCI/IC			17			
8	D/N/O			18			
9	GC			19			
10	LC			20			

SUSPENSE

Date

Remarks:

Are there some
Brookings type
potentials here?

[Signature]

CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE
1717 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Suite 503 Washington, D.C. 20036

Bill -

Executive Registry

74-5103

The attached will give you some idea
of the Endowment's changing shape and
of some of our experimental new
programs.

I think you may even find parts of the
report of real personal interest.

With warm regards.

Tom

Tom Hughes

February 10, 1974

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
Bilderberg Conference To Discuss Inflation

1
2
The twenty-second Bilderberg conference, an annual gathering of US and European business, scientific, and political leaders for an unofficial exchange of views on matters of international concern, will be held at Ismir, Turkey in April. For the discussions this year on "Inflation and its Effects," the group will include more central bank directors and trade union officials than usual. British Conservative leader Margaret Thatcher has also been asked to attend. Dutch Prince Bernhard, who initiated the series of meetings in 1954 at the Bilderberg hotel in the eastern Netherlands, chairs the annual sessions, at which main speakers are allowed only ten minutes and others are limited to five. (Unclassified)

25X1A

February 24, 1975

-6-



UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Washington, D.C. 20451

OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR

April 30, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Robert M. Kimmitt,
Executive Secretary, National Security Council

Charles Hill,
Executive Secretary, Department of State


Colonel John H. Stanford,
Executive Secretary, Department of Defense

STAT

[Redacted]
Executive Secretary, Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: Asilomar Conference Speech

A draft copy of the Director's speech to be given on May 5, 1984, before the Asilomar Conference in Monterey, California, is attached. Any comments you may have on this speech should be phoned to me (632-4767) not later than Monday, April 30, 1984. This speech draws on the previously distributed Bilderberg speech and other cleared materials.


William B. Staples
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
As stated



L-2666

FORGING IDEAS FOR EFFECTIVE ARMS CONTROL

IT IS A PLEASURE TO HAVE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO ADDRESS THE 38TH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE ASILOMAR CONFERENCE.

A STANDARD SAYING IN WASHINGTON GOES SOMETHING LIKE THIS: "NEGOTIATING WITH THE SOVIETS IS NOT REALLY ALL THAT BAD COMPARED TO THE ORDEAL OF NEGOTIATING OR, TO BE MORE ACCURATE, BATTLING, WITHIN THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT TO GET A POSITION IN THE FIRST PLACE." THAT IS UTTERED ONLY HALF IN JEST. MAJOR -- AND SOMETIMES QUITE BITTER -- DIFFERENCES HAVE CERTAINLY BEEN COMMON, IF NOT THE RULE OF THE DAY, IN NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. NARROWING AND RESOLVING THOSE DIFFERENCES ARE THE PURPOSE AND DIFFICULT TASK OF NEGOTIATION.

BUT, IN TRUTH, THE DISAGREEMENTS THAT TAKE PLACE OVER THE BARGAINING TABLE IN GENEVA CAN PALE COMPARED TO SOME OF THE DEBATES OVER ARMS CONTROL PURPOSES AND POLICIES THAT TAKE PLACE IN WASHINGTON. THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, THE CONGRESS, THE PRESS, THE BUREAUCRACY AND THE PUBLIC ALL PARTAKE TO VARYING DEGREES, DEPENDING ON THE ISSUE, ONE CONGRESSIONAL PARTICIPANT NOT LONG AGO SUGGESTED THAT "THE KEY QUESTION IN STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL TODAY IS WHETHER WE CAN GET BEYOND NEGOTIATING AMONG OURSELVES SO THAT WE CAN BEGIN TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE SOVIET UNION".

-2-

FREE AND OPEN EXCHANGES ARE PART OF WHAT MAKES US A GREAT NATION, SOME DIVERGENCY OF VIEWPOINTS ON ARMS CONTROL WILL NO DOUBT ALWAYS PERSIST, BUT WE NEED TO RECOGNIZE THAT THIS IS A SUBJECT WHERE A LARGE DEGREE OF CONSENSUS IS VITALLY NECESSARY IF WE ARE TO HAVE ANY CHANCE OF SUCCEEDING, WE SIMPLY CANNOT AFFORD TO BE DIVIDED OVER THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF OUR APPROACH,

SERIOUS ARMS CONTROL IS A LONG-TERM ENDEAVOR AND OUR PRINCIPAL NEGOTIATING PARTNER -- THE SOVIET UNION -- TAKES A LONG-TERM PERSPECTIVE ON FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES, MOSCOW DOES NOT NECESSARILY SHARE OUR IMPATIENCE WITH REGARD TO RESOLVING THE PRESSING PROBLEMS OF NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL, IF THE SOVIETS PERCEIVE THAT WE ARE DIVIDED, THEY WILL ATTEMPT TO EXPLOIT THOSE DIVISIONS, IF THE SOVIETS CALCULATE THAT LATER PROPOSALS MAY BE PUT FORWARD WHICH ARE MORE FAVORABLE TO THEM, THEY ARE FULLY PREPARED TO WAIT,

HAVING A GENERAL UNDERSTANDING OF HOW OUR SYSTEM WORKS, THE SOVIETS FREQUENTLY ASSUME THAT IF THEY SIT BACK AND HANG TOUGH, THEY CAN COUNT ON US TO NEGOTIATE WITH OURSELVES AND COME UP WITH NEW PROPOSALS TO TRY TO MOVE THEM, IT IS AN AGE-OLD STRATEGY, UNFORTUNATELY, EXPERIENCE HAS SHOWN THE SOVIETS THAT IT IS A SAFE AND SOMETIMES WISE STRATEGY FOR THEM TO PURSUE,

-3-

THIS UNDERLINES THE NEED FOR SOME CONSTANCY AND CONSENSUS, OR AT LEAST SUFFICIENT SUPPORT, IF OUR ARMS CONTROL EFFORTS ARE TO BE SUCCESSFUL. THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION HAS PUT GREAT EFFORT INTO BUILDING BIPARTISAN SUPPORT AT HOME AND GREATER COMMONALITY AND CONSULTATION WITH OUR ALLIES. THIS ALSO UNDERLINES THE NEED TO TRY TO LOOK AHEAD, FARTHER DOWN THE ROAD, TO SEE HOW WE CAN STRENGTHEN OUR BASIC ARMS CONTROL OBJECTIVES AND THE PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN THEM.

THE US ARMS CONTROL AGENDA UNDER PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS BEEN, AND CONTINUES TO BE, AN EXTENSIVE ONE.

- O BEFORE THE SOVIETS WALKED OUT OF THE INF TALKS, WE INTRODUCED FOUR INITIATIVES, WORKING CLOSELY WITH OUR ALLIES, TO TRY TO OVERCOME THE IMPASSE. THE SOVIETS, HOWEVER, PERSISTED IN THEIR HALF-ZERO OPTION: THAT IS, ZERO LAND-BASED INF SYSTEMS FOR NATO AND HUNDREDS FOR THE SOVIET UNION.
- O WE HAVE SEVERAL MAJOR PROPOSALS AND APPROACHES ON THE TABLE IN START, ALL AIMED AT ACHIEVING DEEP REDUCTIONS IN THE MOST DESTABILIZING STRATEGIC SYSTEMS. THE SOVIETS HAVE INDEFINITELY SUSPENDED THOSE TALKS BUT ARE LIKELY TO RETURN, IF NOT LATER THIS YEAR THEN

-4-

NEXT. WE ARE NOW ACTIVELY REVIEWING POSITIONS TO INSURE THAT WHEN THE SOVIETS DO COME BACK, WE WILL BE READY AND FLEXIBLE.

- O MULTILATERAL ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE WHERE MUCH OF THE ACTION IS THIS YEAR -- IN THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT WE ARE FOCUSING ON A TOTAL GLOBAL BAN ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS AS RECENTLY PROPOSED BY THE US; IN MBFR WE LOOK FORWARD TO SHOWING SOME FLEXIBILITY ON THE DATA QUESTION IF THE EAST IS READY TO BE FLEXIBLE ON VERIFICATION ISSUES; AND IN THE CDE WE WILL TRY TO GET DOWN TO SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS, BUT SOVIET WILLINGNESS REMAINS A QUESTION MARK.

RATHER THAN DISCUSS SPECIFIC ISSUES IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS, I WOULD LIKE TODAY TO FOCUS ON TWO LONGER-TERM APPROACHES -- SOMEWHAT "NEW TRACKS", IF YOU WILL -- TOWARD ACHIEVING OUR ARMS CONTROL OBJECTIVES. THE FIRST IS THE NEED TO SEEK WAYS BY WHICH WE CAN, OVER TIME, REDUCE THE ROLE AND PERCEIVED IMPORTANCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN OUR DEFENSE POSTURE. THE SECOND IS THE DESIRABILITY OF GIVING FURTHER CONSIDERATION TO HOW WE MIGHT ADVANCE ARMS CONTROL OBJECTIVES THROUGH LESS FORMAL AND PROBABLY LESS COMPREHENSIVE ARRANGEMENTS. BOTH OF THESE TRACKS HAVE POTENTIAL PROMISE IF WE ARE WILLING AND ABLE TO PURSUE THEM.

-5-

DE-EMPHASIZING NUCLEAR WEAPONS

A GREAT CONCERN AMONG WESTERN PUBLICS FOCUSES ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THAT IS ENTIRELY UNDERSTANDABLE. NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE TRULY TERRIFYING INSTRUMENTS CAPABLE OF WREAKING UNPARALLELED DESTRUCTION. NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE WORLD TODAY ADD UP TO 5,000 TIMES ALL THE FIREPOWER THAT WAS USED BY ALL SIDES DURING WORLD WAR II.

NO DOUBT, WE NEED TO EXPLAIN BETTER THE ROLE THESE WEAPONS OCCUPY IN NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY AND, IMPORTANTLY, OUR EFFORTS TO REDUCE THEM.

NUCLEAR DETERRENCE WILL, FOR AS FAR AS WE CAN SEE INTO THE FUTURE, BE A CENTRAL ELEMENT IN US SECURITY POLICY. THE US COMMITMENT OF THAT DETERRENT FOR THE PROTECTION OF US ALLIES IS AT THE HEART OF NATO. WHATEVER ELSE WE DO, WE MUST NOT CAST DOUBT ON THE VIABILITY OF THAT DETERRENT STRATEGY, AS DOUBT ONLY INCREASES INSTABILITY AND THE CHANCES OF MISCALCULATION.

BUT A NUMBER OF FACTORS ARGUE FOR BEGINNING TO EXAMINE SOME POSSIBLE STEPS TOWARD REDUCING THE EXTENT TO WHICH WE RELY ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN US AND WESTERN SECURITY STRATEGY. FOR ONE, THE US NO LONGER HAS THE CLEAR NUCLEAR SUPERIORITY THAT IT ENJOYED UP UNTIL THE LATE 1960'S. FOR ANOTHER, THE PROSPECT THAT NUCLEAR WAR COULD HAVE

-6-

DRASTIC, LONG-TERM, GLOBAL EFFECTS IS BEING DRIVEN HOME MORE AND MORE BY SOME RECENT RESEARCH. THE IDEA OF A "NUCLEAR WINTER" -- WHICH KNOWS NO BOUNDARIES BETWEEN ATTACKER AND THE ATTACKED OR BETWEEN COMBATANTS AND INNOCENT PEOPLES -- MAY BE WELL-FOUNDED.

FINALLY, BUT BY NO MEANS LAST, THERE IS GREAT AND UNDERSTANDABLE CONCERN AMONG WESTERN PUBLICS OVER NUCLEAR WEAPONS THAT I HAVE NOTED. PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN OUR DETERRENT STRATEGY WILL BE UNDERMINED IF WE ARE PERCEIVED AS RELYING TOO HEAVILY ON THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR ANNIHILATION.

IT IS BOTH REASONABLE AND POSSIBLE TO PROVIDE DECISION-MAKERS WITH CAPABILITIES THAT WILL PRESENT OPTIONS OTHER THAN THE HOBSON CHOICE OF EARLY INITIATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS USE WITH THE DANGER OF ANNIHILATION OR INACTION WITH THE DANGER OF SURRENDER AND LOSS OF FREEDOM. NEW CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS TECHNOLOGIES OFFER ONE WAY TO REDUCE OUR RELIANCE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS. NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL CAN ALSO HELP.

SIGNIFICANT OPPORTUNITIES ARE OPENING UP IN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS SYSTEMS THAT COULD PROVIDE WAYS OF DE-EMPHASIZING NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON BOTH THE STRATEGIC AND THEATER LEVELS. CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS THAT COULD EFFECTIVELY ASSUME MILITARY ROLES THAT UP UNTIL NOW HAVE BEEN

-7-

ACHIEVABLE ONLY BY NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE ON THE HORIZON. THESE SYSTEMS ARE BASED ON TECHNOLOGIES FOR IMPROVED WAYS OF FINDING AND DISTINGUISHING TARGETS ON THE BATTLEFIELD AND IN THE REAR; ON MORE SOPHISTICATED COMMAND, CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS; AND ON MORE EFFECTIVE CONVENTIONAL MUNITIONS -- THE SO-CALLED SMART WEAPONS.

OUR ARMS CONTROL EFFORTS ARE DESIGNED TO AFFECT SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS IN FORCES. START AND INF WOULD DIRECTLY REDUCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. ALL OUR PROPOSALS IN THESE TALKS ARE CONSISTENT WITH OUR NUCLEAR DETERRENCE STRATEGY. NEVERTHELESS, THEY REFLECT A WILLINGNESS TO REDUCE THE EMPHASIS THAT HAS BEEN PLACED TO DATE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

IN ADDITION, THE WEST HAS TAKEN SEVERAL UNILATERAL STEPS TO REDUCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE US NUCLEAR STOCKPILE TODAY IS A THIRD BELOW ITS 1967 PEAK, YET STILL MORE EFFECTIVE. ALLIANCE DECISIONS OVER THE LAST FOUR YEARS WILL RESULT IN A NET DECREASE OF 2,400 WEAPONS IN THE NUCLEAR STOCKPILE IN EUROPE.

THESE ARMS CONTROL EFFORTS, COMBINED WITH IMPROVEMENTS IN OUR CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITIES CAN SET THE STAGE FOR A SECURITY POLICY THAT PLACES LESS EMPHASIS ON THE ROLE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. SOME OF THESE CONVENTIONAL OPPORTUNITIES

-8-

AND PROGRAMS ARE, ADMITTEDLY, STILL IN THE EARLY STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT. BUT WE NEED TO LOOK AT THEM NOW IN TERMS OF HOW THEY CAN ENHANCE OUR DETERRENT POSTURE AND PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN IT.

A LOOK AT THE LATE 1950'S AND, PARTICULARLY, THE 1960'S SHOWS US THAT EFFORTS TO SIGNIFICANTLY STRENGTHEN CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITIES HAVE RUN UP AGAINST TWO MAJOR CONCERNS. THE FIRST RELATES TO THE EFFECT GENERALLY ON THE US NUCLEAR COMMITMENT TO NATO; THE SECOND RELATES TO COST.

PAST EFFORTS BY THE US TO STRENGTHEN CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITIES -- AND THEREBY TO DE-EMPHASIZE NUCLEAR WEAPONS -- RUN THE RISK OF SEEMING TO EUROPEANS AS A WEAKENING OF THE BASIC AMERICAN COMMITMENT TO ITS ALLIES. IT SEEMS TO ME, HOWEVER, THAT STRENGTHENED CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITIES WOULD ACTUALLY ENHANCE THAT COMMITMENT BY SUPPLEMENTING, NOT REPLACING, THE NUCLEAR COMPONENT.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES ARE, GENERALLY SPEAKING, MORE EXPENSIVE THAN NUCLEAR DEFENSE. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE REAL COST OF SIGNIFICANTLY STRENGTHENED CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE HOTLY DISPUTED -- AS ARE MANY OTHER DEFENSE COST ISSUES.

-9-

THIS DOES NOT ARGUE FOR A CHANGE IN NATO'S STRATEGY OF DETERRENCE AND FLEXIBLE RESPONSE. THAT DOCTRINE, CAREFULLY CRAFTED IN THE 1960'S, HAS SERVED THE ALLIANCE WELL AND REMAINS VALID TODAY.

MOREOVER, A CONVENTIONAL BUILD-UP SHOULD CLEARLY NOT BE ENTERTAINED AS A WAY TO MAKE POSSIBLE A POLICY OF "NO FIRST-USE" OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. EVEN IF SUCH A MAJOR BUILD-UP WERE ATTAINABLE, WHICH IS HIGHLY QUESTIONABLE, THAT POLICY WOULD BE BOTH UNWISE AND DANGEROUS. TO QUALIFY THE US COMMITMENT TO ITS OWN DEFENSE OR TO THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE WITH A "NO FIRST-USE" POSTURE WOULD LOWER THE SOVIET CALCULATION OF THE RISKS AND POTENTIAL COSTS OF AGGRESSION AGAINST NATO. THAT WOULD NOT SERVE OUR FUNDAMENTAL POLICY OBJECTIVE OF DETERRENCE.

BUT FLEXIBLE RESPONSE -- SUPPLEMENTED BY AN INTEGRATED POLICY FOR CONVENTIONAL FORCE DEVELOPMENT THAT WOULD OFFER A CHOICE OF "NO EARLY FIRST-USE" -- WOULD PRESERVE AN EFFECTIVE DETERRENT AND GO A LONG WAY TO REASSURING OUR PUBLICS. AND, AS PROFESSOR MICHAEL HOWARD HAS NOTED, "REASSURANCE" OF WESTERN PUBLICS AND POLITICAL STRUCTURES HAS BEEN AS IMPORTANT IN MAINTAINING OUR FREEDOM AND SECURITY AS HAS "DETERRENCE" IN ITS NARROWER SENSE.

-10-

DE FACTO AND DE JURE ARMS CONTROL

GENERALLY SPEAKING, SOME ARMS CONTROL EFFORTS MIGHT TAKE A SLIGHTLY DIFFERENT SHAPE IN YEARS TO COME. TO DATE THEY HAVE BEEN LARGELY IN THE FORM OF FORMAL AGREEMENTS AS THE MEANS OF IMPOSING LIMITS. THESE, OF COURSE, ESTABLISH MUTUAL AND SPECIFIC LEGAL OBLIGATIONS BINDING ON THE PARTIES. WE SHOULD, WHERE POSSIBLE, CONTINUE TO SEEK SUCH LEGALLY BINDING ARRANGEMENTS TO REDUCE AND OTHERWISE LIMIT ARMS.

AT THE SAME TIME, WE SHOULD BE ALERT TO POSSIBILITIES FOR ENGAGING IN ARMS CONTROL BY MUTUAL RESTRAINT, MUTUAL EXAMPLE, OR MUTUAL AGREED NATIONAL UNDERTAKINGS. THIS COULD BE COMPRISED, FOR EXAMPLE, OF STATEMENTS OF NATIONAL POLICY -- UNILATERAL UNDERTAKINGS BY THE SIDES -- WHICH COULD BE NEGOTIATED AND CONFIRMED IN EXCHANGES OF DECLARATIONS OR LETTERS. THE OUTCOME WOULD BE DE FACTO ARRANGEMENT WHICH, IN SOME INSTANCES, COULD BE BOTH EASIER TO ACHIEVE AND SIMPLER TO CARRY OUT.

THESE KIND OF ARRANGEMENTS WOULD NOT, OBVIOUSLY, APPLY TO ALL SITUATIONS. IN WEIGHING THE RELATIVE MERITS OF A DE JURE OR DE FACTO ARRANGEMENT IN ANY GIVEN CASE, CERTAIN CONSIDERATIONS COME TO MIND.

-11-

COMPREHENSIVENESS IS ONE OF THEM. THIS IS BOTH A VIRTUE AND A PROBLEM. IT IS A VIRTUE IN THE SENSE THAT IT IS BEST TO LIMIT ALL CRITICAL CATEGORIES OF ARMS AND FORCES. OTHERWISE, SYSTEMS THAT ARE NOT LIMITED HAVE A TENDENCY TO BE BUILT UP AND EXPLOITED. THIS CAN, EFFECT, UNDERCUT THE CONSTRAINTS ON SYSTEMS LIMITED. IT IS A LOT LIKE A BALLOON THAT IS SQUEEZED IN ONE AREA ONLY TO BULGE OUT IN AREAS THAT ARE NOT SO CONSTRAINED.

THE FIRST STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION AGREEMENT, FOR EXAMPLE, FROZE THE NUMBER OF INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILE AND SUBMARINE LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILE LAUNCHERS, BUT PLACED NO REAL LIMITATIONS ON THE NUMBER OF WARHEADS OR ON THROWWEIGHT -- IMPORTANT MEASURES OF THE OVERALL DESTRUCTIVE CAPABILITY OF MISSILES. WE WITNESSED, DURING THE 1970'S, SIGNIFICANT INCREASES IN THE NUMBER OF WARHEADS ON THESE MISSILES WITH THE US NUMBER DOUBLING AND THE SOVIET NUMBER MORE THAN TRIPLING. WE SAW, PARTICULARLY, A TREMENDOUS INCREASE IN THE THROW-WEIGHT CAPABILITY OF THE SOVIET MISSILE FORCES, AND IT IS NOW NEARLY TWO-AND-A-HALF TIMES THE US FORCES IN THIS REGARD.

WHILE A MORE COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT IS MORE LIKELY TO LIMIT REAL MILITARY CAPABILITY, THEY ARE BY DEFINITION MORE COMPLEX AND DIFFICULT TO NEGOTIATE. THEY ARE ALSO,

-12-

IN MANY RESPECTS, MUCH MORE DIFFICULT TO VERIFY. IN FACT, ACHIEVING COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENTS IN SOME AREAS ARE TODAY, JUST AS THEY HAVE BEEN THROUGHOUT THE HISTORY OF ARMS CONTROL, VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE BECAUSE OF THE VERIFICATION DIFFICULTIES. HENCE, WE ESTABLISH PRIORITIES AND SEEK TO BE AS COMPREHENSIVE AS POSSIBLE,

DE FACTO ARRANGEMENTS WOULD HAVE A TENDENCY TO BE LESS COMPREHENSIVE, AND TO FOCUS ON AREAS OR SYSTEMS WHERE VERIFICATION PRESENTS FEWER RATHER THAN MORE PROBLEMS. THEY WOULD, IN THEORY, BE EASIER TO NEGOTIATE AND POSSIBLY QUICKER. BY BEING LESS FORMAL, DE FACTO ARRANGEMENTS WOULD ALSO BE MORE EASILY MODIFIED IF CIRCUMSTANCES CHANGED THAN WOULD LEGALLY-BINDING TREATIES OR AGREEMENTS. THAT, AS WELL, CAN CUT BOTH WAYS DEPENDING ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES. IN GOING DOWN A MORE LIMITED PATH IN ANY GIVEN AREA, HOWEVER, WE WOULD NEED TO CONSIDER THE IMPACT OR EFFECT ON OUR BROADER OBJECTIVES,

IN THE UNITED STATES, LAW REQUIRES THAT ANY OBLIGATION UNDERTAKEN WHICH LIMITS OUR ARMED FORCES OR ARMS MUST BE APPROVED BY THE SENATE AS A TREATY OR AUTHORIZED BY SPECIAL ENABLING LEGISLATION PASSED BY BOTH HOUSES OF CONGRESS. THE SALT I INTERIM AGREEMENT WAS APPROVED IN THE LATTER MANNER. ALTERNATIVELY, RESTRAINT AS A NATIONAL

-13-

POLICY -- SUCH AS OUR POLICY ON NOT UNDERCUTTING SALT I OR SALT II AS LONG AS THE SOVIETS EXERCISE SIMILAR RESTRAINT -- WOULD NOT NECESSARILY REQUIRE THAT KIND OF APPROVAL. NEVERTHELESS, WORKING CLOSELY WITH CONGRESS WILL ALWAYS BE NECESSARY TO AVOID ANY APPEARANCE OF TRYING TO "END-RUN THE SYSTEM", WHICH WOULD BE FOOLISH.

I AM NOT SUGGESTING THAT WE SHOULD TURN OUR ATTENTION AWAY FROM THE LONG AND ARDUOUS NEGOTIATIONS ON ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS TO MORE SIMPLE APPROACHES OUTSIDE OF AGREEMENTS. THAT WOULD NOT SERVE OUR INTERESTS OR LIKELY BE SUCCESSFUL.

BUT I AM SUGGESTING THAT, AS WE LOOK DOWN THE ROAD AT ARMS CONTROL, IT MAY BE POSSIBLE TO ADVANCE OUR OBJECTIVES IN CERTAIN AREAS BY ESTABLISHING MUTUAL RESTRAINT THROUGH DE FACTO, RECIPROCAL UNDERTAKINGS. GIVEN THE OBVIOUS PROBLEMS OF NEGOTIATING AND THEN ACHIEVING APPROVAL FOR FULL-FLEDGED ARMS CONTROL ACCORDS, WE SHOULD NOT IGNORE THOSE POSSIBILITIES.

NOR AM I SUGGESTING THAT THIS RESTRAINT SHOULD BE UNILATERAL. UNILATERAL EXAMPLES CAN BE IMPORTANT. WE SHOULD, I THINK WE WILL ALL AGREE, TRY TO LEAD THE WAY TOWARD MORE STABILIZING AND SURVIVABLE SYSTEMS. THE

- 14 -

PRESIDENT'S EFFORT FOR THE SMALL MISSILE, THE SO-CALLED MIDGETMAN, IS JUST SUCH A PROGRAM. MOVING TOWARD MORE STABILIZING SYSTEMS IS CRITICAL TO REDUCING THE RISKS OF WAR.

BUT UNILATERAL ACTION DOES NOT USUALLY GET US VERY FAR AND IS NOT SUFFICIENT. WHILE THE WEST EXERCISED RESTRAINT IN DEVELOPING STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES IN THE 1970'S, WE WITNESSED A MASSIVE AND UNSURPASSED SOVIET BUILDUP. SO, I AM FOCUSING ON RECIPROCAL, NOT UNILATERAL, UNDERTAKINGS.

ARMS CONTROL IS INEVITABLY A MAJOR INGREDIENT IN US-SOVIET RELATIONS. WHETHER THE SOVIETS ARE WILLING TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY AND RETURN TO THE NUCLEAR ARMS TALKS IS THE THE BIG QUESTION MARK. WE, OF COURSE, HOPE THAT THEY CAN GET DOWN TO BUSINESS IN ALL THE ARMS CONTROL DISCUSSIONS.

IF THEY DO, AND IF WE PERSIST IN SOUND POSITIONS, WE CAN LOOK FORWARD TO FIRST, DEEP REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WARHEADS; SECOND, INCENTIVES FOR MORE STABILIZING SYSTEMS AND PENALTIES FOR THOSE THAT HAVE GREATER FIRST STRIKE POTENTIAL; AND THIRD, GREATER PREDICTABILITY IN MILITARY PLANNING. WE SHOULD ALSO HOPE FOR A BETTER SOVIET RECORD ON COMPLIANCE ISSUES.

WE SHOULD NOT THINK, HOWEVER, THAT SUCCESS IN ARMS CONTROL WILL MODERATE SOVIET BEHAVIOR AROUND THE WORLD. WITHIN A FEW MONTHS OF THE JUNE 1973 NIXON-BREZHNEV SUMMIT, FOR EXAMPLE, THE SOVIET CONSPICUOUSLY FAILED TO NOTIFY THE UNITED STATES OF THE OCTOBER 1973 WAR THEY KNEW WAS IMMINENT AND THEN PROVOCATIVELY WIDENED RISKS OF THAT WAR. THE SOVIETS THREATENED TO INTERVENE UNILATERALLY, A MOVE WHICH PROMPTED THE US TO GO ON HIGHER STRATEGIC ALERT. THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN IN DECEMBER 1979 WAS LAUNCHED ONLY A FEW MONTHS AFTER THE CARTER-BREZHNEV SUMMIT IN VIENNA SIGNING SALT II. WE SHOULD, IN THIS LIGHT, NOT LOAD ARMS CONTROL UP WITH POTENTIAL BENEFITS THAT IT CANNOT BE EXPECTED TO DELIVER.

BARBARA TUCHMAN ONCE OBSERVED THAT "A PROBLEM THAT STRIKES ONE IN THE STUDY OF HISTORY, REGARDLESS OF PERIOD, IS WHY MAN MAKES A POORER PERFORMANCE OF GOVERNMENT THAN OF ALMOST ANY OTHER HUMAN ACTIVITY".

BUT, IN THE ADVANCED NUCLEAR AGE, WE CANNOT AFFORD POOR PERFORMANCE IN OUR SECURITY AND ARMS CONTROL STRATEGIES. NOR CAN WE AFFORD NOT TO TRY TO LOOK DOWN THE ROAD TO POSSIBLE NEW, OR AT LEAST DIFFERENT, HORIZONS. I HAVE TRIED TO OUTLINE A COUPLE OF THOSE TODAY. MORE OBVIOUSLY EXIST AND WILL WARRANT OUR ATTENTION.

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

Routing Slip

TO:		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI				
3	EXDIR				
4	D/ICS				
5	DDI	X			
6	DDA				
7	DDO		X		
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC		X		
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/EEO				
14	D/Pers				
15	D/OEA				
16	C/PAD/OEA				
17	SA/IA				
18	AO/DCI				
19	C/IPD/OIS				
20					
21					
22					
		SUSPENSE	1200 hours 14 May Date		

Remarks:


Please prepare response to Clark
for DCI's signature.

11 May 1982
Date

3437 (15-81)

STAT

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 10, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. L. PAUL BREMER III
Executive Secretary
Department of State

LIEUTENANT COLONEL ROBERT P. MEEHAN
Assistant for Interagency Matters
Office of the Secretary of Defense

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Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

MS. JACQUELINE TILLMAN
Executive Assistant to the United States
Representative to the United Nations

MR. JOSEPH PRESEL
Executive Secretary
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

SUBJECT: President's Trip to Europe -- Public
Affairs Campaign

Attached is a paper prepared by ICA concerning public affairs aspects of the President's trip to Europe, June 2-11. We would appreciate your comments on this paper by close of business Friday, May 14, 1982.

Michael O. Wheeler
Michael O. Wheeler
Staff Secretary

Attachment

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review May 10, 1988

CONFIDENTIAL

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Synopsis

A PUBLIC AFFAIRS CAMPAIGN TO SUPPORT AND FOLLOW UP
PRESIDENT REAGAN'S TRIP TO EUROPE JUNE 2-11

Summary: This paper proposes a public affairs campaign for the President's trip. The strategy for this campaign is divided into three phases: laying the groundwork for the trip, maximizing the public affairs opportunities during the visit, and minimizing negative outcomes; and seeking long-term gains following the President's meetings. U.S. public posture regarding major issues is recommended. Specific targets of opportunities are suggested. Although dealing with many domestic U.S. developments the USICA concerns are, of course, international.

Central Recommendation

A dynamic statement of U.S. short and long-term goals for world peace and how we propose to continue the search is needed to help build the necessary international support.

We can best regain the public affairs initiative from the Soviets and respond to the anti-nuclear forces by elevating the public debate to focus on our strategy for attaining world peace.

These purposes can best be achieved by a carefully coordinated set of actions centering on several central arguments to be presented by President Reagan, articulated and reinforced by his principal advisors and supported by key political figures and leaders here and abroad.

It is important to seek to channel attention on the President's plans for world peace before the June meetings in Europe and SSOD in New York; and to add specific proposals to the conceptual statement just before and during the June trip and SSOD. A lull in activity can be expected from late July to mid-September. The USG would then renew efforts with the opening of the next UN General Assembly Session in the fall.

The US approach must be perceived to be genuine, carefully considered, and consistent and therefore predictable. The USG should plan actions and public pronouncements for the fall that carry out the broad strategy and steps announced by the President in the next eight weeks.

GDS - 4/23/88

- 2 -

Action Proposals

1) Private meetings by the President, and/or Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense and ACDA Director with responsible leaders of private group in Washington, D.C. during and following the April 28 Conference of Non-Governmental Organizations to discuss the UN SSOD at the Department of State.

2) A major speech by the President in early to mid-May at a college commencement (e.g. Eureka College May 9) presenting a "Strategy for the Attainment of Enduring World Peace".

3) A series of speeches, public statement or public releases on major arms issues that summarize U.S. positions imply openings and comprise a statement for the record.

4) Series of Public Statements on Selected Themes by Senior USG officials including members of the SSOD Reiterating Continuing Search by the US Peace Through Arms Reduction.

5) A Major Speech by President Reagan, such as the Commencement Address at West Point or Annapolis, May 26, Announcing the Beginning of START Talks, Enunciating US Goals and Posture for the Talks.

6). Appearances at Overseas Events; e.g. the May 13-16 Bilderberg Meeting in Norway, the June 24-26 Freidrich Ebert Foundation "European-American Workshop on Security Issues," (USICA to provide list of opportunities from May through December.)

7) Speech by the President at the UN SSOD.

A separate public affairs strategy paper is being completed by the Agency on the SSOD. That paper follows from the proposals above. Briefly, it is recommended that the President's speech at the SSOD recapitulate US positions enunciated prior to and during his trip to Europe, and add a few specific, if limited, initiatives especially attractive to third world nations.

8. Fall UN General Assembly Speech by President or Secretary of State that Summarizes US Positions to Date, Focuses on the US Search for Peace, Repeats the Theme of the President's Trip to "Peace, Freedom and Prosperity."

Comments on Proposed Speeches and Public Events During the President's Trip.

It will be important for the President in his speeches and public statements in Europe to continue the argument he began in pre-trip addresses. The proposed themes of prosperity, freedom and security should be linked.

- 3 -

It is vital to recognize publically that economic problems color the public view of defense needs, and to argue that the three goals are inextricable elements of the larger goal of a stable peace.

In order to avoid the appearance of a diffuse and overly moralizing statement about shared values, the London speech might focus on the need for the West -- for all nations -- to improve democratic self-government. This approach would give a very practical and definite cast to the President's remarks. U.S. initiatives would further the central foundations of the West. A number of transnational institutions are already involved in this endeavor.

Strategy Paper

A PUBLIC AFFAIRS CAMPAIGN TO SUPPORT AND FOLLOW UP PRESIDENT REAGAN'S TRIP TO EUROPE JUNE 2-11

Summary: This paper proposes a public affairs campaign for the President's trip. The strategy for this campaign is divided into three phases: laying the groundwork for the trip, maximizing the public affairs opportunities during the visit, and minimizing negative outcomes; and seeking long-term gains following the President's meetings. U.S. public posture regarding major issues is recommended. Specific targets of opportunities are suggested. Although dealing with many domestic U.S. developments the USICA concerns are, of course, international.

A. Assumptions

Public pressures both in the United States and overseas against current U.S. security policies are likely to be more intense this Spring than at any time in the past decade. The Vietnam-era network of peace groups is being reconstructed and was evident in "Ground Zero" events April 18-24, in demonstrations here and in Europe and Japan, and in major demonstrations June 10 in Bonn and June 12 at the SSOD in New York. The movements involve diverse, usually non-political people as well as activists.

Although several polls show that Americans are very concerned about the Soviet military buildup and international behavior, public support for a nuclear freeze is equally widespread.

Similarly in Europe, several polls show the appeal of a nuclear freeze, broad opposition to the development of intermediate range nuclear weapons such as Pershing II and Ground Launched Cruise Missiles, and the Enhanced Radiation Weapon. While majorities of European publics support NATO, and would defend themselves against Soviet attack, equally sizable majorities share the sentiment, albeit less intensely, of the anti-nuclear movement.

The several anti-nuclear movements coalescing this Spring are fueled by mounting criticism of U.S. economic policies. Europeans unduly criticize our monetary and trade policies as the leading cause of Europe's economic difficulties. In the U.S., pro-freeze sentiment's somewhat more evident among the lower middle class -- those with a lot to lose because current economic difficulties -- than among the upper middle class. In Europe and Japan, support for nuclear opposition comes from a range of groups that are feeling the economic pinch. The guns-versus-butter tradeoff is very evident, and can become more influential in the absence of improved economic conditions. Deep-seated concern about personal well-being, welfare systems and material standards is a vital force behind antagonism toward nuclear arms modernization and defense spending in Europe and Japan, and is becoming a more prominent factor in the U.S.

The Soviets have generated a least some of the movement in Europe and will exploit every event and sponsor their own such as the May 10-15 peace conference of religious leaders.

GDS - 4/23/88

Therefore, the United States can not expect to mobilize a strong, vocal majority of the American public in favor of USG positions, and must anticipate even greater antipathy in Europe. Although the USG may retain public support for flexibility, other governments are likely to feel even more pressured by activist groups and public opinion. Our long term political and security goals could be affected significantly.

In addition, because our positions are reasoned and complex they lack the simplicity and emotional appeal of the calls of the anti-nuclear movement.

B. Central Recommendation

A dynamic statement of U.S. short and long-term goals for world peace and how we propose to continue the search is needed to help build the necessary international support.

We can best regain the public affairs initiative from the Soviets and respond to the anti-nuclear forces by elevating the public debate to focus on our strategy for attaining world peace.

Only a broad, deeply desired concept of world peace can subsume issues such as the nuclear freeze, the use of specific weapons, or strategies of deterrence.

As the President in his November 18 speech, we must once again

- Get ahead of the peace movement and the Soviets by re-claiming a progressive leadership role;
- Offer imaginative, substantive initiatives for world peace that at least are perceived to be worthwhile alternatives to the several proposals publicly discussed, and at most are far-reaching enough to win sustained support from important segments of the public here and abroad.
- Thereby re-design the agenda for negotiation and public discussion internationally, around our frame of reference and terms.

These purposes can only be achieved by a carefully coordinated set of actions centering on several central arguments to be presented by President Reagan, articulated and reinforced by his principal advisors and supported by key political figures and leaders here and abroad.

C. Timing and Sequence:

It is important to seek to channel attention on the President's plans for world peace before the June meetings in Europe and SSOD in

New York; and to add specific proposals to the conceptual statement just before and during the June trip and SSOD. A lull in activity can be expected from late July to mid-September. The USG would then renew efforts with the opening of the next UN General Assembly Session in the fall.

D. Approaches

While a Strategy for Peace should be a distinct set of Administration proposals with the President's personal imprimatur, every effort should be made to develop broad political support here and abroad. This should involve senior members of the Administration, bi-partisan Congressional endorsement, supportive public statements by prominent U.S. citizens, foreign officials and leaders.

Even if there will be some who oppose or differ with some elements of the President's strategy, it is vital that the efforts be perceived widely as an attempt to associate with the international concern about war and the yearning for peace and prosperity that dominate contemporary anti-nuclear forces.

The US approach must be perceived to be genuine, carefully considered, and consistent and therefore predictable. The USG should plan actions and public pronouncements for the fall that carry out the broad strategy and steps announced by the President in the next eight weeks.

E. Action Proposals

1) Private meetings by the President, and/or Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense and ACDA Director with responsible leaders of private groups in Washington, D.C. during and following the April 28 Conference of Non-Governmental Organizations to discuss the UN SSOD at the Department of State.

Public Affairs Purpose: to demonstrate the willingness of the Administration to reach out and entertain the views of respected public figures and leaders of the peace movement. Also to give the Administration leaders a chance personally to mention USG commitment to an enduring peace, and exchange views on arms reduction issues.

Conduct: photo opportunity followed by informal private discussions, with no set agenda or necessary structure; followed by low-key positive mention of the discussions by Administration spokesmen and hopefully positive comments by representatives at the discussions.

USG Support: mention at White House and Department press briefings; private comments to influential columnists that the meetings are part of an ongoing effort by the Administration to hear and seriously consider the views of those concerned about issues of war and peace, and to craft a US position which recognizes the desirable goals and reflects those elements that seem legitimate and practicable. USICA wireless file, Voice of America coverage.

- 2) A major speech by the President in early to Mid-May at a college commencement (e.g. Eureka College May 9) presenting a "Strategy for the Attainment of Enduring World Peace".

Public Affairs Purpose: To present and begin the development of a central concept that at once integrates and elevates several dimensions of the peace issue. Also to provide a broader substitute for "nuclear freeze" or "no first use of nuclear weapons" and to focus attention on the most important goal of lasting world peace. To make the case that this goal is more important than its parts; to relate this goal to several themes in American experience -- the search for peace, the search for prosperity and the search for freedom.

Conduct: The speech, presented at a college commencement, would invariably suggest comparisons with the World Peace speech of John F. Kennedy in 1963. It should be promoted as deserving national and international TV and radio coverage.

USG Support: Off-the-record or deep-background discussions with leading columnists and commentators. Live Satellite and taped feeds facilitated by USICA overseas; full VOA and USICA Wireless File coverage; fast pamphlet production and distribution in English, French, Spanish, German, and by individual USICA posts in host country languages. USICA Foreign Press Center set up special brief tour for selected group of foreign journalists to personally attend the commencement and do local color on American hopes and fears about preventing nuclear war, maintaining our security interests even if it is costly and containing Soviet expansion.

- 3) A series of speeches or public statements or public releases on major arms issues that summarize U.S. positions, imply openings and comprise a statement for the record.

Public Affairs Purpose: To keep before the public USG concern for attaining peace through arms reduction. To establish US orientation, if not detailed positions, on major arms issues. To remind publics of the wide scope of US concerns, and the diverse efforts undertaken by the USG in the past three decades. To have ready for the SSOD a compendium that US briefers, the US delegation and US officials abroad can call upon readily.

Conduct: Senior USG officials should present a speech, fully coordinated within the USG, on selected issue areas including a summary of our position at INF.

USG Support: Full USICA, VOA Wireless File coverage; special press briefings at USICA foreign press center; exclusive interviews for selected senior foreign correspondents, or small groups of selected correspondents with appropriate USG officials (Field, Rostow, Burt, Perle, others.)

- 5 -

4) Series of Public Statements on Selected Themes by Senior USG officials including members of the SSOD Delegation Reiterating Continuing Search by the US for Peace Through Arms Reduction.

Public Affairs Purpose: To reiterate USG active search for ways to reduce arms, increase international stability while protecting Western security and thereby assure lasting peace. To provide alternatives for the growing press coverage of anti-nuclear events. To provide opportunities for meetings with concerned groups, to be perceived as reaching out to anti-nuclear and peace forces.

Conduct: Senior and middle level US officials should repeat the central goal of lasting peace through arms reduction, develop USG views on the need for verification, the need for equality of arms, the desirability of regional self-defense to avoid situations that draw in outside powers stress the history of U.S. arms efforts, other themes.

USG Support: VOA and USICA Wireless File coverage, USICA Foreign Press Center facilitate foreign press coverage, supportive briefings or interviews.

5) A Major Speech by President Reagan, such as the Commencement Address at West Point or Annapolis, May 26, Announcing the Beginning of START Talks, Enunciating US Goals and Posture for the Talks.

Public Affairs Purpose: To capture the initiative for the US in the Public arena. To focus global attention on the US agenda for arms reduction. To demonstrate USG bona fides in the search for peace. To link military preparedness and arms reduction as necessary complements in the attainment of stability and lasting peace.

Conduct: Set at one of this nation's prestigious military academies, the speech will suggest a national consensus in support of attaining a stable world peace. While honoring those who serve in America's military the speech will be perceived overseas as having the support of US defense institutions. The speech will make the point that this nation views military preparedness as a deterrent and therefore an instrument of peace rather than destruction.

USG Support: Secretary of State Haig Backgrounder, similar to the backgrounder November 18. Full VOA and USICA Wireless File Coverage; USICA to facilitate live satellite broadcast or taped feeds, as well as foreign press coverage. Appearances by Vice President Bush, Secretary of State Haig, Secretary of Defense Weinberger, Judge Clark, others on talk shows; USICA pickup for use abroad.

6) Appearances at Overseas Events; e.g. the May 13-16 Bilderberg Meeting in Norway, the June 24-26 Freidrich Ebert Foundation "European-American Workshop on Security Issues," (USICA to provide list of opportunities from May through December.)

Public Affairs Purpose: To present US views and USG positions on East-West relations, security issues. To demonstrate our receptivity to the views of others. To reiterate US concerns for working out a stable peace.

Conduct: Senior and middle level officials would participate in these meetings and ancillary functions including press contact and public briefings, arranged by USICA posts.

USG Support: Commitments by USG officials, respected Congressional leaders and influential private citizens are needed. USICA and USICA posts will make all arrangements.

7) Speech by the President at the UN SSOD

A separate public affairs strategy paper is being completed by the Agency on the SSOD. That paper follows from the proposals above. Briefly, that the President's speech at the SSOD recapitulate US positions enunciated prior to and during his trip to Europe, and add a few specific, if limited, initiatives especially attractive to third world nations.

8) Fall UN General Assembly Speech by President or Secretary of State that Summarizes US Positions to Date, Focuses on the US Search for Peace, Repeats the Theme of the President's Trip on "Peace, Freedom and Prosperity."

Public Affairs Purpose: To reinforce US efforts to gain recognition as a mainstay of global peace and with support for US positions; to continue to set the agenda for international discussion rather than react to the Soviet or third world agenda

USG Support: Secretary of State or US Ambassador to the UN Kirkpatrick backgrounder on the speech. USICA Wireless File and VOA Coverage; USICA facilitates foreign media coverage.

E. Comments on Proposed Speeches and Public Events During the President's Trip

In his speeches and public statements in Europe, it will be important for the President to continue the argument he began in pre-trip addresses. The proposed themes of prosperity, freedom and security should be linked.

It is vital to recognize publically that economic problems color the public view of defense needs, and to argue that the three goals are inextricable elements of the larger goal of a stable peace.

After the Versailles meeting a Presidential statement could acknowledge the shared Western concerns about the health of the global economy. Specific commitments for actions that respond to important to European concerns will gain a positive public response and set a constructive tone for the entire trip.

- 7 -

The Agency has developed a public affairs paper recommending possible U.S. public posture regarding economic issues that will arise at the Versailles meeting and remain significant later (attached). Like the Department of State memorandum of April 8 on the two summits, this paper recognizes the important spillover affect that the Versailles Conference will have on the rest of the trip. Our research shows that economic issues are exerting a clear influence on the willingness of the Western community to cooperate on political/security affairs.

The President can make the case that the Western community should regard a healthy economic situation as a vital base for needed security measures, and that adequate security -- as shown by recent history -- is a central requisite for stable Western economic growth and material well-being, and even for a stable political basis for East-West relations.

The London speech should challenge younger generations to study the past, communicate with those who have earlier experience and build on a future that improves upon the past. The speech would be, in effect, another commencement address by a senior statesman yet should avoid appearing patronizing. As suggested in the Department of State memoranda of April 8, the speech should recommend innovative ways for the Western community to renew shared values.

In order to avoid the appearance of a diffuse and overly moralizing statement about shared values, the London speech might focus on the need for the West -- for all nations -- to improve democratic self-government. This approach would give a very practical and definite cast to the President's remarks. U.S. initiatives would further the central foundations of the West. A number of transnational institutions are already involved in this endeavor.

The President's speech can point out the challenge to the global community to achieve stable self-government that advances human interests. This is a significant international concern with implications for a contrast between democracy and authoritarian or totalitarian approaches. It provides one rationale for U.S. views of East-West and North-South relations that is important to make, especially because of the high level of political cynicism in Europe regarding U.S. motives.

Carefully crafted, the London speech could be a highly useful basis for explaining American world views, and for designing an acceptable public framework for viewing diverse US policies.

F. Additional Opportunities; Followup

In addition a number of events and opportunities in the coming six months, while not in all cases focused directly on the President's trip, will have a bearing on US policy objectives.

For example, the May 10 luncheon of Soviet emigres, including Alexander Solzhenitsyn, should make a highly charged moral statement about the hypocrisy of the Soviet Union conference of religious

figures to discuss world peace. Private U.S. religious leaders are considering additional actions and public statements. Foreign officials and leaders should be encouraged to speak out also. For each of the several preparatory and followup meetings to the Summit, U.S. officials should in their public statements reiterate the broader objectives of the U.S. and allied objective of a stable peace.

USICA would, with State, Defense, the NSC and ACDA assign responsibilities and develop a package of materials for U.S. use, for private sector groups to use overseas, and as background use in encouraging public statements and articles by foreign officials and leaders.

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

2153

ACTION
April 19 1973

JANKA for ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER

FROM: Helmut Sonnenfeldt *HS*

SUBJECT: Ten Questions from Swedish Journalist in
Connection with Possible Bilderberg Attendance

You have a telegram from Lars Eklund (Tab A) posing ten written questions -- "as agreed by your secretary by telephone yesterday" -- which he wants you to answer in 150-250 words each. Actually, some of the questions are pretty good, but I assume that in line with your decision to confine yourself solely to Bilderberg, you will not want to respond. Eklund wanted the replies by April 24.

RECOMMENDATION

That if you want to decline, Les Janka inform Eklund by telegram or TELEX to that effect.

Janka decline *HK* done by Telex *HS*

Other

*What was the sense
in giving Eklund?*

3.16068
The White House
Washington

WN1 520 VIA RCA

1973 APR 18 AM 10 01

STOCKHOLM 1158 APR 18 1973

DR HENRY KISSINGER

THE WHITE HOUSE

URGENT AUX MAINS DR KISSINGER FOLLOWING TEN QUESTIONS AS
AGREED YOUR SECRETARY BY TELEPHONE YESTERDAY STOP THE QUESTIONS
ARE NOT TOO PRECISE NOR AGGRESSIVE THE POINT BEING YOU SHOULD HAVE
CHANCE ANSWER FREELY WITHIN THE LIMIT DRAWN BY YOUR JOB STOP
EACH ANSWER HAVE LENGTH OF 150-250 WORDS PARAGRAPH QUESTION
ONE DO YOU BELIEVE INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS PROMOTES PEACE ?

ON ONE HAND EVERYBODY WANTS FREE TRADE ON SECOND HAND THERE IS
THE QUESTION OF SURVIVAL OF THE FITTEST STOP WHATS YOUR CONCEPT
OF THIS PROBLEM? PARAGRAPH QUESTION TWO DO YOU BELIEVE IN
A SUCCESSFUL COEXISTANCE OF DIFFERENT ECONOMIC SYSTEMS
COMMUNISM LIBERALISM CAPITALISM? DO THESE SYSTEMS TEND TO
CONVERGE TO BECOME MORE SIMILAR IN PRACTICE AND WHAT DOES THIS
MEAN TO TENSION OR LESSENING OF TENSION IN INTERNATIONAL
POLITICS? PARAGRAPH QUESTION THREE DO INTERNATIONAL OR MULTI-
NATIONAL COMPANIES PROMOTE WELFARE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES?
DOES POLICY OF MAXIMISED PROFITS BY FOREIGN COMPANIES MEAN

HELP TO THESE COUNTRIES PARAGRAPH QUESTION FOUR DO YOU BELIEVE
IN A FUTURE FOR LIBERAL OR CAPITALISTIC ECONOMY IN THE POOR
COUNTRIES OR IS A STRONGLY EXERCISED SOCIALISM OR STATE
CAPITALISM THE LIKELY OR THE ONLY WAY PARAGRAPH QUESTION
FIVE TO WHAT EXTENT SHOULD FOREIGN POWERS INTERFERE IN INTERNAL
ECONOMY AND POLITICS OF OTHER NATIONS FOR PROTECTION OF
FOREIGN PRIVATE INTERESTS BUSINESSWISE OR FINANCIALLY? WOULD
SUCH POLICY PROMOTE BETTER INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS, PARAGRAPH
QUESTION SIX DOES WAR OR POLITICAL UNREST PROMOTE UPWARD TRENDS
IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS COMMA DO THEY PROMOTE ECONOMIC GROWTH?

OR DO THEY HURT ECONOMIC EXPANSION BY DIRECTING RESOURCES
WRONGLY PARAGRAPH QUESTION SEVEN IS STRATEGIC POLITICAL MILITARY
CONSIDERATIONS THE BASIS OF MOST ASSISTANCE FROM THE MAXI
POWERS TO OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD? OR IS THEIR POLICY TO
BUILD A WORLD WITH BETTER CHANCES FOR BETTER BUSINESS? OR
WHAT IS THE MIX PARAGRAPH QUESTION EIGHT WHICH ARE THE GRAVEST
POLITICAL RISKS FOR STAGNATION OR LESS GROWTH IN INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMY IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE? OR WHAT REASONS DO WE HAVE
TO BE OPTIMISTIC PARAGRAPH QUESTION NINE WHAT QUALIFICATIONS
CONSTITUTE A GLOBAL NEGOTIATOR COMMA BRIDGE BUILDER AND

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2011/04/28 : LOC-HAK-33-1-4-9

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TROUBLESHOOTER? NO CRACK PLEASE: WHAT PERSONAL CAPACITIES
DOES ONE NEED TO COMMUNICATE WITH THE MAO'S OF THIS WORLD COMMA
NOT WITH THE LIVS PARAGRAPH QUESTION TEN TO WHAT EXTENT COMMA
IF ANY COMMA DO OPINIONS AMOUNT SMALL NATIONS AND VOICED BY
SPOKESMEN OF SUCH NATIONS MEAN ANYTHING TO BIG POWER DECISIONS
IN SERIOUS CONFLICTS? DO THEY ONLY SEMIFREEZE RELATIONS BETWEEN
TRADITIONALLY FRIENDLY NATIONS COMMA LIKE BETWEEN THE UNITED
STATES AND SWEDEN? BY THE WAY WHAT IDEAS COULD SUCCESSFULLY BE
EXERCISED FOR UNFREEZING SUCH RELATIONS PARAGRAPH QUESTIONS AND
ANSWERS TO BE PUBLISHED IN VECKANS AFFAERER COMMA SCANDINAVIANS

LEADING AND HIGHLY REPUTED BUSINESS MAGAZINE AT OPENING
OF BILDERBERG MEETING HERE STOP APPRECIATE YOUR CABLED ANSWERS
NOT LATER THAN EARLY DAY HOURS NEWYORK TIME TUESDAY APRIL 24
PARAGRAPH ADDRESSED TO LARS EKLUND VECKANS AFFAERER CABLE
ADDRESS FORLAGET STOCKHOLM STOP OR TELEXWISE STOCKHOLM 17473
BONBIZ ATTENTION EKLUND VECKANS AFFAERER STOP MY HOME TELEHPHONE
NUMBER IS STOCKHOLM 7651447 LOOKING FORWARD TO YOUR KIND
COOPERATION AND INTERESTING ANSWERS SINCERELY YOURS

LARS EKLUND

HAK CHRONS - JUNE 1969

June

- 2 *Memo. HAK to Pres. N. NATO Proposals*
- ✓ 2 Ltr to Charles H. Percy/from HAK - ABM
- ✓ 3 Note to Mr. Moynihan/from HAK - article by Peter Drucker
- ✓ 3 Memo for Flanigan/from HAK - Subject: Your Memo on Views of the Jewish Community
- ✓ 3 Memo for Butterfield/from Haig - activities of CIA - impact on ABM
- ✓ 4 Memo for Sec of State/from HAK - Backgrounders
- ✓ 4 Memo for Helms/from HAK - Meeting with Pres of Mexico
- ✓ 4 Ltr to Dirk U. Stikker/from HAK - Western Europe
- ✓ 4 Ltr to Prof Brzezinski/from HAK - ltr to Marty Hillenbrand
- ✓ 4 Ltr to Charles W. Yost/from HAK - Southern Africa
- ✓ 4 Ltr to Charles W. Yost/from HAK - U Thant's remarks
- ✓ 4 Memo for SecDef/SecSt, AID and BOB - Subject: FY 1970 Foreign Aid Program from HAK -
- ✓ 5 Memo for Ehrlichman/from HAK - Subject: Comment on Suggested Invitation to Khrushchev
- ✓ 5 Memo for Pres/from HAK - Subject: The GVN's Ability to Compete with the Viet Cong
- ✓ 5 Memo for Richardson/from HAK - Subject: Under Sec Committee Memo on REDCOSTE
- ✓ 5 Memo for Butterfield/from HAK - Subject: Cabinet Officers Visits to Eastern Europe
- 5 *Memo. HAK to Pres. N. Spanish Base*
- ✓ 10 Ltr to Adm Arleigh Burke/from HAK - Kyoto Conf
- ✓ 10 Memo for Flanigan/from HAK - Subject: David Lilienthal's Contract in Vietnam

DOE review completed.

June

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
- ✓ 10 Ltr to R. W. van de Velde/from HAK - Philip Habib's nomination for a Rockefeller Public Service Award
- ✓ 10 Memo for HAK/from Walsh - Subject: The Pres' desire to meet with Mr. Leonard Unger, Amb to Thailand
- ✓ Memo for Butterfield/from HAK - subject: Three Papers on the ABM
- ✓ 11 Ltr to Mr. Marcus Ehrlich/from HAK - acknowledging receipt of his ltr of May 16
- ✓ 11 Memo for Stylianos Pattakis/Deputy PM, Athens/from HAK -
- ✓ 11 Memo for Under Sec of State/from HAK - Subject: Boris N. Sedov, Second Sec, USSR Embassy
- ✓ 11 Memo for Harlow/from HAK - Subject: Briefing Cong on our Middle East Policy
- ✓ 12 Note for HAK/from Sneider - VC offer of an interim coalition 25X1
- ✓ 13
- ✓ 13 Memo for Gerard Smith/from HAK - Eisenhower Statement of Dec 29, '59
- ✓ 13 Memo for Pres/from HAK - Subject: Study on Laos
- ✓ 13 Memo for HAK/from Sneider - Subject: Asia Foundation
memo, HWS to HAK 11. 11. 59
- ✓ 14 Ltr to Joseph E. Johnson/from HAK - Bilderberg Conference
- ✓ 14 Ltr to Henry Owen/from HAK - MIRV-SALT-ABM issues
- ✓ 14 Memo for Chairman, AEC/from HAK - Subject: Communication of U. S. Atomic Information to Canada
- ✓ 16 Ltr to Dr. Lewis L. Strauss/from HAK - ltr to Senator Dodd
- 16 Ltr to T. H. Moorer/from HAK - Korean waters carrier issue

June

3

~~17 Ltr to Engelberg/from HAK - Subject: Vietnam~~

- ✓ 17 Memo for Pres/from HAK - Subject: GVN National Assembly Action Against Premier Huong
- ✓ 20 Memo for SecState/SecDef, Dir of CIA/from HAK - Subject: Review of U.S. Contingency Plans by Washington Special Action Group
- ✓ 20 Ltr to Robert Shaplen/from HAK - acknowledging his letter
- ✓ 23 Memo for Haig/from Fazio/subject - Analysis of Rocket Attacks on Saigon with Cambodia Bombings
- ✓ 23 Memo for Walsh/from HAK - Subject: Foreign Military Sales to Greece
- not found 23 Ltr to Oskar Morgenstern/from HAK - ABM and China policy
- ✓ 23 Memo for Gerard Smith/from HAK - Subject: Presidential Statements Regarding Arms Control
Memo Bogstein to HAK re: Int'l Monetary Policy meeting w/ Pres.
- not found 26 Memo for Pres/from HAK - Rocket attack on Saigon
- not found 26 Memo for SecState/from HAK - Subject: Your Draft Msg for Amb Bunker
- ✓ 26 Ltr to Daniel Ellsberg/from HAK - Subject: Vu Van Thais memo
- ✓ 26 Ltr to Geroge W. Rathjens/from HAK - MIRV moratorium
- ✓ 26 Ltr to Amb Lucet/from HAK - Pres Pompidou's speech
- ✓ 26 Memo for Under SecState/from HAK - Subject: Under Sec Committee Consideration of Arms for Laos
- ✓ 26 Memo for Ehrlichman/from HAK - Subject: Peru and Hickenlooper Amendment
- ✓ 26 Msg for Amb Bunker/from HAK - Visit to Saigon
Memo, HAK to Pres: re: Sec. Brooke letter on MIRV's
- 25 Memo for HAK/from Sneider - Subject: Presidential Msg to PM Thanom
- ✓ 27 Memo for Walsh/from Haig - Article by Paul Ward
- ✓ 27 Memo for Sec St/from HAK - Subject: Your Msg for Amb Bunker
- ✓ 30 Memo for Whitaker/from HAK - Subject: Romania
Memo, HAK to Under Sec. of State re: Romania



CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

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
21 May 1958

CA. Dear Allen:

Knowing your interest in the Bilderberg Group, I thought you might like to see the attached summary of the discussion of an enlarged Steering Committee meeting a month ago. It is a pretty good summary, although it does not bring out as sharply as it might have the strong differences between, for example, Fritz Erler and Denis Healey on the one hand and Spaak and the Americans on the other.

With warm personal regards,

Sincerely yours,


Joseph E. Johnson

Enclosure

Allen W. Dulles, Esq.
Central Intelligence Agency
2430 E Street
Washington 25, D. C.